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Matthew was 11, John was two, and Lisa was a newborn when they were removed from 
their mother’s care because of her drug addiction and placed in the foster care system.1 
Instead of helping, the foster care system further traumatized the children. The children’s 
first foster home was de-licensed after another child was severely physically abused in the 
home. The siblings were then separated, and John was beaten with a belt in his next foster 
placement. The newborn was placed in a home with a convicted rapist. Matthew began 
having behavior problems and engaging in gang activity. Although their mother loved 
her children, she needed help herself, and the addiction and parenting support programs 
available to her were ineffective.
P
erhaps the most distressing part of this story is how common 
these circumstances are for child-welfare–involved children. As 
many as 80 percent of parents whose children are in foster care 
suffer from a substance abuse disorder.2 And while removing 
children from their original homes can be essential in many 
circumstances, it also increases their risk of engaging in delinquent 
1 Pseudonyms have been used to protect the identities of Lisa, John, and Matthew.
2 Arazais Oliveros and Joan Kaufman, “Addressing Substance Abuse Treatment Needs of Parents 
Involved with the Child Welfare System,” Child Welfare 90 (1) (2011): 25–41, available at http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4158612/; Nancy K. Young, Sharon M. Boles, and Cathleen Otero, 
“Parental Substance Use Disorders and Child Maltreatment: Overlap, Gaps, and Opportunities,” Child 
Maltreatment 12 (2) (2007): 137–49, available at http://cmx.sagepub.com/content/12/2/137.
behaviors,3 substance use,4 and ultimately ending up in prison.5 The long-
term societal costs of removing children from their original homes, rather 
than seeking to treat parental addiction issues and preserve families where 
possible, are enormous — and sometimes continue for generations.
Regardless of whether children are removed from their homes, child 
maltreatment is a public health problem with substantial costs to society. 
A study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that the 
total cost of child maltreatment is $124 billion each year.6 Despite these 
enormous costs, few evidence-based interventions address the needs of 
either maltreated children7 or their parents.8 The situation may be exac-
erbated because federal child welfare expenditures have decreased, even 
though the number of child maltreatment reports has increased across 
the country. As a result, child welfare services are increasingly reliant on 
3 Susan M. Snyder and Darcey H. Merritt, “Do Childhood Experiences of Neglect Affect Delinquency 
Among Child Welfare Involved–Youth?” Children and Youth Services Review 46 (2014): 64–71, 
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0190740914002941; Joseph P. Ryan and 
Mark F. Testa, “Child Maltreatment and Juvenile Delinquency: Investigating the Role of Placement and 
Placement Instability,” Children and Youth Services Review 27 (3) (2005): 227–49, available at http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0190740904002026.
4 Susan M. Snyder and Rachel E. Smith, “Do Physical Abuse, Depression, and Parental Substance Use 
Influence Patterns of Substance Use Among Child Welfare Involved–Youth?” Substance Use & Misuse 
50 (2) (2015): 226–35, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25338287; Amy Heneghan 
et al., “Mental Health Problems in Teens Investigated by U.S. Child Welfare Agencies,” Journal of 
Adolescent Health 52 (5) (2013): 634–40, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23375826.
5 Sara McCarthy and Mark Gladstone, “State Survey of California Prisoners: What Percentage of the 
State’s Polled Prison Inmates Were Once Foster Care Children?” Policy Matters (California Senate Office 
of Research: 2011), available at http://www.sor.govoffice3.com/vertical/Sites/%7B3BDD1595-792B-
4D20-8D44-626EF05648C7%7D/uploads/Foster_Care_PDF_12-8-11.pdf; Susan M. Snyder and Rose 
Anne Medeiros, “Typologies of Substance Use and Illegal Behaviors: A Comparison of Emerging Adults 
with Histories of Foster Care and the General Population,” Children and Youth Services Review 35 (5) 
(2013): 753–61, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0190740913000509.
6 Xiangming Fang et al., “The Economic Burden of Child Maltreatment in the United States,” Child 
Abuse & Neglect 36 (2) (2012): 156–165, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0145213411003140.
7 Mary Dozier et al., “Developing Evidence-Based Interventions for Foster Children: An Example of a 
Randomized Clinical Trial with Infants and Toddlers,” Journal of Social Issues 62 (4) (2006): 765–783, 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540–4560.2006.00486.x/full; Nancy Rolock, 
Susan M. Snyder, and Cynthia Tate, “Formative Evaluation: A Case Study of the Illinois Birth-to-Three 
IV-E Waiver,” Journal of Evidence-Informed Social Work 12 (5) (2015): 37–41.
8 Joan E. Zweben et al., “Enhancing Family Protective Factors in Residential Treatment for Substance 
Use Disorders,” Child Welfare 94 (5) (2015): 145–166, available at http://www.ebcrp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/150612_Enhancing-family-protective-factors-in-residential-treatment-for-substance-
use-disorders.pdf; Richard Barth et al., “Parent-Training Programs in Child Welfare Services: Planning 
for a More Evidence-Based Approach to Serving Biological Parents,” Research on Social Work Practice 
15 (5) (2005): 353–371.
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Social impact bonds, part of a broader suite of outcomes-based 
contracting approaches, constitute a relatively new variation of perfor-
mance-based contracts that focus on funding effective programs in child 
welfare. Social impact bonds are public-private partnerships that shift risk 
from the government to investors: An intermediary raises private capital, 
chooses service providers to provide an evidence-based intervention, and 
selects an independent assessor to determine performance outcomes and 
the evaluation approach.14 Government is required to pay only if the 
intervention works as intended.15
Because of the size and complexity of the child welfare system, ensuring 
that social impact bonds can be effective in that context requires starting 
with a well-designed study, with the following components: a clearly 
defined population and problem, an intervention, a comparison, and the 
desired outcome.16
It is best practice for evaluations of social impact bonds to include a 
comparison or counterfactual, which is a way to see what would happen 
if the intervention were not given. One way to provide counterfactuals 
is to use randomized controlled trials.17 In randomized controlled trials, 
participants are randomly assigned by an impartial method, such as a flip 
of a coin, to determine whether they receive the intervention the social 
impact bond provides. Although randomized controlled trials are consid-
ered the gold standard for scientific research, they are sometimes not used 
because some argue that it is unethical to withhold a treatment that could 
work. The irony is that failing to use randomized controlled trials may do 
more to withhold effective interventions, because that can allow treat-
ments that may not work to be scaled up, wasting limited resources.
14 Ibid; Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Social Impact Bonds: A Promising New Financing Model to Accelerate Social 
Innovation and Improve Government Performance,” Center for American Progress (2011), available at 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/report/2011/02/09/9050/social-impact-bonds/.
15 Laura Callanan, Jonathan Law, and Lenny Mendonca, “From Potential to Action: Bringing Social 
Impact Bonds to the US,” McKinsey & Company (2012), available at http://www.payforsuccess.org/
resources/potential-action-bringing-social-impact-bonds-us. 
16 Nancy Rolock, Susan M. Snyder, and Cynthia Tate, “Formative Evaluation: A Case Study of the Illinois 
Birth-to-Three IV-E Waiver,” Journal of Evidence-Informed Social Work (2015): 1–12, available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25826248; W. Scott Richardson et al., “The Well-Built Clinical 
Question: A Key to Evidence-Based Decisions,” ACP Journal Club 123 (3) (1995): A12, available at 
https://acpjc.acponline.org/Content/123/3/issue/ACPJC-1995-123-3-A12.htm.
17 Liebman, “Social Impact Bonds” (2011).
dwindling state and local funds.9 Thus, social impact bonds may provide a 
way to address child welfare service needs that cannot be met in the current 
economic climate. 
Children like Lisa, John, and Matthew might be far more likely to have 
better outcomes if our child welfare policies focused on what really works. 
Although we spend a great deal on social programs, seldom are the results 
of programs adequately assessed, which allows programs that don’t work 
to endure far too long and draw resources from other, more effective 
interventions.10 This chapter discusses social impact bonds, which strive to 
fund child welfare programs that achieve desired outcomes without wasting 
resources on programs that don’t work. 
OVERVIEW
A predecessor to social impact bonds, called performance-based contracts, 
emerged in the early 1990s as one way to fund what works in child 
welfare.11 Rather than paying for a unit of a particular service (e.g., an 
overnight stay in a foster home), performance-based contracts can reward 
private agencies that achieve or exceed specific outcomes and/or penalize 
agencies that fail to achieve specific outcomes (e.g., children are reunified 
with parents, children are adopted, or parents are able to provide a safe 
and supportive home environment).12 At least 27 states have experimented 
with performance-based contracts for one or more child welfare services.13
9 Kristina Rosinsky and Dana Connelly, “Child Welfare Financing SFY 2014: A Survey of Federal, 
State, and Local Expenditures,” Annie E. Casey Foundation (October 2016), available at https://www.
childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2016-53ChildWelfareFinancingSFY2014.pdf. 
10 Eric Trupin, Nicholas Weiss, and Suzanne U. Kerns, “Social Impact Bonds: Behavioral Health 
Opportunities,” JAMA Pediatrics 168 (11) (2014): 985–86, available at http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com/
article.aspx?articleid=1900479. 
11 Crystal Collins-Camargo and Karl Ensign, “Driving Case Outcomes in Child Welfare: Are Performance-
Based Contracts the Answer?” Policy & Practice 68 (3) (2010): 11, available at https://www.questia.com/
magazine/1G1-229069168/driving-case-outcomes-in-child-welfare-are-performance-based.
12 Bowen McBeath and William Meezan, “Governance in Motion: Service Provision and Child Welfare 
Outcomes in a Performance-Based, Managed Care Contracting Environment,” Journal of Public 
Administration Research & Theory 20 (suppl_1) (2010): i101–i23, available at https://jpart.oxford-
journals.org/content/20/suppl_1/i101.short; Emma Tomkinson, “Outcome-Based Contracting for Human 
Services,” Evidence Base 1 (1) (2016): 1–20, available at https://journal.anzsog.edu.au/publications/20/
EvidenceBase2016Issue1Version1.pdf; Charlotte McCullough, Nancy Pindus, and Elizabeth Lee, 
“Preparing Effective Contracts in Privatized Child Welfare Systems,” HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation (2008), available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/preparing-effective-
contracts-privatized-child-welfare-systems; Lawrence L. Martin, “Performance-Based Contracting for 
Human Services: Does It Work?” Administration in Social Work 29 (1) (2005): 63–77.
13 Crystal Collins-Camargo and Karl Ensign, “Driving Case Outcomes in Child Welfare: Are Performance-
Based Contracts the Answer?” Policy & Practice (3) (2010): 11, available at https://www.questia.com/
magazine/1G1-229069168/driving-case-outcomes-in-child-welfare-are-performance-based.
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child welfare services without such contracts.22 Liebman asserts that 
social impact bonds could provide a means of helping foster youth and 
youth involved in juvenile justice to successfully transition to adulthood.23 
Hawkins et al. contend that social impact bonds could effectively support 
the widespread use of preventive interventions.24 With this in mind, 
evidence-based prevention and intervention programs could be initiated to 
address a wide range of issues pertaining to child welfare over the course 
of development. One example of a prevention program is SafeCare,25 
which is an in-home program for at-risk or maltreating parents that could 
be implemented in more communities throughout the world.26 Examples 
of programs that address trauma include the Attachment and Behavioral 
Catch-Up for children from birth to 24 months, Parent-Child Interaction 
Therapy for youth from two to 12 years old, and the Safe Harbor 
program for youth six to 21 years old.27
Despite their potential, social impact bonds also have some weaknesses. 
Service providers may be deterred by the risk that the intervention could 
fail, or they (or their investors) may require large fees to assume the risk. 
Scaling up social impact bonds can be difficult because what works for 
one population may not work for another.28 Social impact bonds may 
also cost more than programs that government delivers directly.29 Another 
22 Nick Axford and Louis Morpeth, “Evidence-Based Programs in Children’s Services: A Critical 
Appraisal,” Children and Youth Services Review 35 (2) (2013): 268–77, available at http://www.
sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.gsu.edu/science/article/pii/S0190740912003994.
23 Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Building on Recent Advances in Evidence-Based Policymaking,” Results for 
America and The Hamilton Project (2013), available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/
files/downloads_and_links/THP_LiebmanF2_4-13_1.pdf.
24 J. David Hawkins et al., “Unleashing the Power of Prevention,” Institute of Medicine of the National 
Academies (2015), available at http://aaswsw.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Unleashing-the-Power-of-
Prevention-formatted-4.29.15.pdf.
25 For more information see http://safecare.publichealth.gsu.edu/safecare/safecare-research/; Anna Edwards 
and John R. Lutzker, “Iterations of the SafeCare Model: An Evidence-Based Child Maltreatment 
Prevention Program,” Behavior Modification 32 (5) (2008): 736–56, available at http://bmo.sagepub.
com/content/32/5/736.short.
26 See additional examples for a range of preventative programs at https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/
preventing/programs/. 
27 See additional examples at http://www.nctsn.org/resources/topics/treatments-that-work/
promising-practices.
28 Liebman, “Social Impact Bonds” (2011).
29 Callanan, “From Potential to Action” (2012).
EXAMPLES
States, counties, and child welfare agencies are beginning to embrace 
social impact bonds to reduce costs and improve outcomes. Connecticut, 
for example, obtained $12.5 million in private investments for a social 
impact bond using the Family-Based Recovery (FBR) intervention, which 
researchers from Yale University and the University of Connecticut found 
to be an effective treatment intervention for parental substance abuse.18 
FBR is an in-home, intensive, long-term clinical treatment intervention 
to keep families of children under the age of eight intact while providing 
the services needed (e.g., substance use treatment, parent-child relation-
ship support, developmental guidance, and case management) to ensure 
that the home is a safe and supportive environment.19 In Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, a $4 million social impact bond is housing and providing 
supportive services to 135 homeless parents with children in foster care, 
to reduce the children’s length of stay in foster care.20 In Illinois, the 
Dually-Involved Youth Project was developed to target youth who are 
involved in both the juvenile justice and child welfare systems, since nearly 
two-thirds of those youth spend time in costly institutional care and half 
recidivate within two years.21
Although the literature regarding the strengths of child welfare social 
impact bonds is sparse, there are indications that social impact bonds 
may have the potential to strengthen the child welfare system. Axford 
and Morpeth suggest that the outcomes-based focus of social impact 
bonds may be a better fit for employing programs with a proven track 
record (i.e., evidence-based practice) than providing traditional public 
18 Kyle Constable and Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, “New Program Announced for Substance Abuse 
Treatment,” The CT Mirror (February 16, 2016), available at https://ctmirror.org/2016/02/16/
new-funding-to-boost-substance-abuse-treatment/.
19 Yale School of Medicine, “Program for Families Affected by Substance Use (FBR)” (2017), available at 
https://medicine.yale.edu/childstudy/family/fbr.aspx; Karen E. Hanson et al., “Family-Based Recovery: 
An Innovative In-Home Substance Abuse Treatment Model for Families with Young Children,” Child 
Welfare 94 (4) (2015): 161–83.
20 Patrick Lester, “Pay-for-Success in Child Welfare: A Case Study,” Social Innovation Research Center (2015).
21 Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, “Illinois Dually-Involved Youth Pay for Success 
Initiative Ramp-Up Fact Sheet” (2015).
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may be outraged if children are harmed by a program that was perceived 
as having a profit motive.
CONCLUSION
Although there are challenges, social impact bonds can play an important 
role in advancing child welfare. Science and ethics must play a central role 
in any such venture, and political will must be built among participating 
stakeholders to ensure optimal designs at every phase. Because the stakes 
are so high, social impact bonds should be considered as an option for child 
welfare only when the most rigorous evaluation approaches are used. In 
addition, child welfare social impact bonds require robust data systems to 
capture integrated data from each service provider children encounter, so 
that we can investigate fully what factors influence desired outcomes, both 
positively and negatively. Finally, it is imperative that all parties involved 
in social impact bonds are honest when interventions fail, because children 
like Lisa, John, and Matthew deserve interventions that work.
SUSAN M. SNYDER is an assistant professor in the department of social work at Georgia 
State University. Dr. Snyder has over a decade of practice experience in the field of child 
welfare, which informs her commitment to advancing research in the field. Dr. Snyder 
investigates the sequelae of problem behavior, including substance use and illegal 










possibility is that service providers may avoid providing services in 
difficult cases that are less likely to succeed when compensation is tied to 
measurable success.
GIVEN THE EVIDENCE, WHY AREN’T SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
MORE WIDESPREAD?
A few barriers have prevented more widespread use of social impact bonds 
in funding the child welfare system, including their complexity. Service 
providers may already struggle to engage in performance-based contracting 
without the added layers of investors or intermediaries. Additionally, it can 
be harder to measure real change than other metrics that are easier to quan-
tify but do not necessarily signal improvements in care. According to Stid, it 
is easier to quantify the resources that go into an intervention (inputs) and 
the products produced, such as the number of parenting training sessions 
(outputs), than the actual measurable changes the intervention produces 
(outcomes).30 Martin’s survey of 614 members of the National Institute of 
Governmental Purchasing found that only 39.9 percent of new contracts 
or contract extensions were awarded based on performance outcomes, as 
opposed to other measures like inputs and outputs.31
Another factor that may prevent social impact bonds from spreading in 
the child welfare field is that children in foster care have complex needs 
and are served by multiple agencies and programs across local, state, 
and federal government. This is particularly true of the high-needs users 
of child welfare services, such as children with severe emotional and 
behavioral problems. Additionally, individuals at each agency may have 
disparate and conflicting interests that may prevent needed collaboration 
and lead to competition for credit. Consequently, it may be difficult to 
track costs and service utilization, which is essential in order to pay off 
the intermediaries and investors. Finally, the failure of these programs 
could attract negative media attention.32 The impact of such attention in 
child welfare may be particularly profound because the general public 
30 Daniel Stid, “Pay for Success Is Not a Panacea,” Community Development Investment Review (2013): 
13–18, available at http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/pay-for-success-not-panacea.pdf.
31 Lawrence L. Martin, “Performance-Based Contracting for Services: A Survey of NIGP Members,” 
(Orlando, FL: GSA Training Conference and Expo 2010), available at http://208.112.78.139/gsaS-
chedule2010/training/ppt/PerformanceBasedContractingForNIGP.ppt.
32 Stid, “Pay for Success Is Not a Panacea” (2013). 
